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ABSTRACT 
In September 2011, the United States and Romania signed the cooperative anti-
missile agreement for the United States to build, operate, and maintain ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) system elements at Deveselu Air Base, the previously 
confirmed selection for the Romanian site of Phase II of the so-called European 
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).  The plans envision Deveselu Air Base 
hosting land-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors by 2015, as part of 
the Aegis Ashore (AA) System. This vision is important because the United 
States, Romania, and other NATO allies face ballistic missile threats, particularly 
amid the increasingly unsettled situation in the Middle East.  The EPAA also 
marks a major development in the broader context of policy and strategy, both 
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and between NATO and other 
states in the regions, as NATO and the United States thereby both significantly 
extend deterrence in expanding their BMD reach.  This thesis tests how the plans 
for the deployment of U.S. BMD system elements in Romania reflect and support 
the U.S. and trans-Atlantic Alliance strategic purposes and what the political 
significance of this deployment is in U.S.-Romanian relations, in U.S. relations 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In September 2011, the United States and Romania signed a legally 
binding cooperative agreement for the United States to build, operate, and 
maintain ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) elements at Deveselu Air 
Base. (The base was the Romanian site of Phase II of the so-called European 
Phased Adaptive Approach [EPAA].)1  The plans envision Deveselu Air Base 
hosting land-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors, as part of the Aegis 
Ashore (AA) System, by 2015. The deployment of U.S. missile defense 
interceptors in Romania will serve U.S. and NATO security interests.  This 
decision is important because the United States, Romania, and other NATO 
allies face ballistic missile threats, particularly amid the increasingly unsettled 
situation in the Middle East.2 The EPAA also marks a major development in the 
broader context of policy and strategy both within the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and between NATO and other states in the regions, as NATO and 
the United States thereby both significantly extend deterrence in expanding their 
BMD reach.  The present study focuses on this larger aspect, asking specifically: 
How do the plans for the deployment of U.S. BMD system elements in Romania 
reflect and support strategic purposes of the United States and the Alliance? 
What is the political significance of this deployment in U.S.-Romanian relations, 
                                            
1. At the time of this writing, the formal ratification by the Romanian Parliament of this 
agreement is expected within weeks or months. This paper proceeds on the assumption that the 
agreement is, in fact, as much of a “done deal” as current accounts indicate. See “Agreement 
Between the United States of America and Romania on the Deployment of the United States 
Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania,” U.S. Embassy Romania, accessed September 23, 
2011, http://romania.usembassy.gov/policy/missile-defense-agreement.html. 
2. BMD capabilities support extended deterrence defense and assurance purposes. See 
David S. Yost, “U.S. Extended Deterrence in NATO and North-East Asia,” in Bruno Tertrais, ed., 
Perspectives on Extended Deterrence (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, May 
2010), Recherches et Documents no. 3/2010, pp. 15-36, available at 
http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/rd/2010/RD_201003.pdf; Georgeta Gavrila, 
“Rolul NATO in Asigurarea Securitatii Zonei Extinse a Marii Negre,” Centre for Defence and 
Security Strategic Studies 1 (2009): 1–18. 
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in U.S. relations with other NATO allies and in the Alliance as a whole, and in 
U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
While new NATO members and partners are embracing political and 
military change at their own national risk,3 competition among new members 
appears to push their political elites toward democratic behavior and statecraft (in 
the conventional Western sense), civilian control of the military, public 
accountability, and so on. This same competition also moves the new NATO 
states clearly to embrace NATO’s desired political-military objectives.  For 
example, once the Romanians agreed to host U.S. BMD system elements, other 
NATO members agreed to host such U.S. capabilities, too.  Romanians are in 
negotiations to buy new or used F-16s from Lockheed Martin, and other NATO 
states are sure to follow suit.4  Thus, NATO appears rightly to impute qualitative 
democratic changes for new NATO members.  Still, while embarking on 
advanced capabilities, new NATO members appear to take on more risks and 
challenges that prove comforting and reassuring to their publics.   
In order to understand the strategic and political purposes of advances in 
the military capabilities of NATO members (with the acquisition of advanced 
radars or aircraft), especially among such newer members as Romania, it is 
necessary to define the extent of these advances.  Ultimately, the basis on which 
the United States, Romania, and other member states made their decisions on 
BMD promises to influence the future of NATO decision-making—not least 
                                            
3. Defense budgets of peripheral NATO member states are budgets like any other 
constrained by the lack of resources or credit.  Defense resources are contracting in these difficult 
times.  Defense spending is declining in the peripheral member states, at least temporarily. 
Peripheral NATO members converging with European fiscal policy struggle to sustain 3-percent 
GDP deficit constraints while collecting fiscal and tax revenues.  This crisis then is challenging for 
NATO members fulfilling NATO commitments in terms of burden sharing relative to each 
member’s economic crisis condition. 
4. “Lockheed Martin; Romania Awards Lockheed Martin Contract to Provide 17 Radar 
Systems,” Defense & Aerospace Week (March 17, 2008): 71; “Spending $4.5 billion for F-16s, 
Equipment And Parts,” Defense Daily International 9, no. 21 (2008); “Romania Goes F-16.” 
Military Technology 34, no. 5 (2010): 14. 
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because the decision represents an unprecedented increase in partnership and 
interoperability, with a political and BMD system that defends NATO countries, 
Israel, even Russia, and at least as far as the boundaries of this newly extended 
deterrence. This Romanian decision also reflects Romania’s own interests in 
harmony with the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law, and affirms 
NATO security indivisibility. It also recognizes the shared strategic mutual 
security envisioned in Article III of the Washington Treaty, and recognizes NATO 
provisions in such documents as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (NATO 
SOFA) of 1951 in London, the U.S.-Romania Defense Cooperation Agreement of 
2005, the U.S.-Romania Classified Military Information Agreement in 1995, and 
the NATO Security Agreement of 1997.  Additionally, this decision recognizes the 
threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery by ballistic 
missile, reconfirms EPAA and BMDS’s defensive operation, recognizes a 
legitimate collective approach in response to terrorist threats against international 
stability, and reassures Romania’s national defense and common goals in 
defense of NATO allies and partners, while honoring the standing Defense 
Cooperation Agreement.5 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Despite the Russian Federation military doctrine’s silence on the topic of a 
specific Iranian ballistic missile threat, and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin’s dismissal of the existence of an Iranian ballistic missile threat altogether, 
BMD findings by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), testimony by Commander, United States European 
Command (EUCOM) and contemporary sanctions on Iran demonstrate that Iran 
is more competent in missile technology than North Korea today.6  Longer-range 
                                            
5. U.S. Embassy Romania, “Agreement Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania.” 
6. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” The Russian Federation, accessed 
February 5, 2010, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Russia2010_English.pdf; James G. Stavridis, 
“Testimony of Admiral James G. Stavridis, United States Navy Commander, United States 
European Command Before the 111th Congress,” in European Command Posture Statement, 
(Washington, D.C., 2010). 
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missiles and solid-fuel technology mean these weapons can be hidden in less 
vulnerable locations, while requiring shorter launch times.  Ranging 2,000 
kilometers, Iran’s tested solid-fuel Sajiil 2 and liquid-fuel Shahab 3 missiles 
readily can reach as far as Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania.7  Efforts 
toward a Shahab 3 variant, also known as Shahab 3A, and the Ashura may 
realize a three-stage missile that ranges 3,700 kilometers, meaning Iran will 
threaten most other Western European countries directly as well.8   
Current BMD system elements also include SM-3 (Block IA) interceptor 
missiles on U.S. Aegis air defense warships deployed off the Israeli coast. The 
EPAA plans focus on defense against ballistic and cruise missiles fired mainly 
from sites ashore with over flight paths over Turkey, Romania, and Poland.  
Nevertheless, plans also exist to defend against missile threats fired from ships, 
tasking the use of Aegis BMD-capable ships as relevant, while U.S. and NATO 
allies, as well as partners, examine deterrence and reassurance issues regarding 
the use of SM-3 BMD capabilities, near-term at Deveselu Air Base in Romania 
(2011) and longer (2015, 2018, 2020).  All told, the future of BMD warships 
deployed in the Adriatic, Black, and Baltic Seas may serve the reassurance 
purposes NATO is seeking and augment the future of NATO’s extended land-
based deterrence.   
Romanian, U.S., and NATO security concerns addressed by the U.S. 
Defense Shield, originally proposed in the Czech Republic and Poland, 
benefitted Romania geographically only partially. Allegedly, Romania’s southern 
region simply did not fall under the umbrella of ballistic defense.  The new 
proposal covers all of Romania, exceeding comprehensive NATO and Romanian 
                                            
7. “Iran tests new surface-to-surface missile,” CNNWorld, accessed May 20, 2009. 
http://articles.cnn.com/2009–05–20/world/iran.missile.test_1_surface-to-surface-missile-ballistic-
missile-defense-organization-longer-range?_s=PM:WORLD. 
8. Dennis Mays, “Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat Graphic” (Annual Security Review 
Conference, OSCE, 2007): 4; Anders F. Rasmussen, “Speech NATO Secretary-General at the 
Bucharest University” (speech at Bucharest University, Bucharest, Romania, May 7, 2010); 
Stephan Frühling and Svenja Sinjen, “Missile Defense: Challenges and Opportunities for NATO” 
(Research Paper, NATO Defense College, 2010). 
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security objectives. Yet the new system also raises several questions about how 
NATO member-states work with and in the Alliance.  Plans for improved SM-3 
missiles (Block IB) based in Eastern Europe, including Romania, are on track to 
being realized. Will political and financial support sustain the phased approach 
for SM-3 missiles (Block IIA), ground-based interceptor (GBI), or the 
development of the more advanced SM-3 derivatives to intercept longer-range 
missiles?9   
In what ways should NATO’s political and material capability for BMD 
develop?  Initially, missile defense mitigation of ballistic missile threats may 
inspire allies, partners, and even competitors to join NATO at the table of 
diplomacy and cooperation.10   With the perceived threat from global terrorism, 
as well as from non-governmental and non-state actors, and keeping in mind the 
emergence of conventional threats, NATO commanders may want to weigh in on 
integrated European and American sensors and interceptors as a core Alliance 
missile defense system on a continuous basis.  Acknowledging the real fiscal 
constraints facing European defense budgets, the United States and European 
NATO member countries will prioritize that the EPAA proposal serve NATO, the 
European Union, both or none of the above.11   Lastly, NATO should continue 
monitoring contemporary developments in missile defense technology and 
threats.   
The dialogue on BMD was again at a breakthrough in November 2010 
among the United States, NATO, and Russia.  Renewed commitments assure 
the movement forward of EPAA politically and financially.  Forecasts to address 
BMD collectively fit in with the NATO vision for how the EPAA and BMD will 
remain viable in the future.  Funding for the national ballistic programs does not 
                                            
9. Frühling and Sinjen, “Missile Defense: Challenges and Opportunities for NATO.” 
10. “Alliance Leaders Agree on NATO Missile Defense System,” NATO, accessed November 
20, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm; Kathy Lally, “Russian President Warns of 
Arms Race,” Washington Post, December 1, 2010, 8. 
11. James Blitz, “Finns Urge EU to Focus on Own Defence,” Financial Times, November 15, 
2010. 
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translate into increases in funding to support EPAA and BMD interceptor system 
elements under the national control of Romania.  NATO and Secretary General 
Rasmussen in recent developments appear hopeful of a large breakthrough in 
pooled funding in positioning BMD’s political and financial support for the time 
being and the future.12  Already, Romania, Poland, Turkey and Spain announced 
their agreement, anticipating that others will join.  Physical deployment of sea-
based and land-based elements will then follow as planned for 2011, 2015, 2018, 
and 2020. 
The significance of U.S. BMD system elements in Romania matters not 
only to the region protected by NATO, but also to such national actors as Russia 
that care about a perceived weakening of their security as a result of BMD 
deployments by NATO.  Dialogue between NATO and Russia on BMD has taken 
place since the conclusion in 1997 of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations.13   
NATO and Russia desired consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and 
joint action to constitute the core of their relations.  The Act established a NATO-
Russian Permanent Joint Council (replaced by the NATO-Russia Council or NRC 
in 2002).  The Act contained NATO’s insistence that the Alliance had “no plan 
and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor 
any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—
and do not foresee any future need to do so.”14  NATO also pledged not to 
station troops in the new member states, while refining the basic scope and 
parameters for an adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. 
Now that the Russians are (again) looking forward to a role in European 
missile defense as voiced at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, though not on American 
terms, the moment appears opportune for new diplomatic security efforts and a 
common missile defense vision between the Alliance-Russia and the U.S.-
                                            
12. Edward Cody, “Russia To Aid NATO On Antimissile Network In Europe,” Washington 
Post, November 21, 2010, 11; Paul Rowan, “Peace Breaks Out As Nato Asks Russia To Join 
Missile Shield,” Sunday Times, November 21, 2010. 
13. “Founding Act on Mutual Relations,” NATO and Russian Federation. (1997). 
14. “Founding Act on Mutual Relations,” NATO and Russian Federation. 
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Russia.  However, the bilateral political processes are not as straightforward as 
the multinational political processes of NATO discussed in a later chapter. As 
legitimate authority over sovereign states and its role in keeping a pacifying order 
in the region, NATO has this understandable responsibility to develop 
cooperative security relations.15  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Washington Treaty and NATO Treaty (1949) describe NATO’s vision 
for extended deterrence in conjunction with expanding its membership.16 General 
background on Romania in NATO is reasonably well developed; hence, the 
observations that follow widely cite and confirm NATO extended deterrence from 
the 1950s to the present.17  They also agree that NATO strategy, after its 
momentary 1989 identity crisis, stimulated change in policy for NATO and the 
Soviet Union from nuclear deterrence postures to the Eastern European missile 
defense developments today. 
Conditions for success for Eastern European NATO member expansion 
are endorsed by diplomatic and strategic visions framed by the November 1991 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and October 1993 Partnership for 
Peace (PfP).18  Today, NATO policy and strategy continues to define conditions 
for decision-making success in the form of principles supporting burden-sharing 
based on community values.  In this case, NATO strategy lays out opportunities 
in extended deterrence and burden-sharing to develop its current vision of 
ballistic missile defense, described by NATO 2020, as an “essential mission.”19 
                                            
15.  Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” Foreign Policy 54 (1984); Eli Lake, “Envoy: 
Europe Relies on U.S. Shield,” Washington Times, November 10, 2009. 
16.  “Washington Treaty,” NATO, accessed July 8, 2010, http://www.nato.int/; “NATO Treaty 
of 1949,” NATO, accessed July 8, 2010, http://www.nato.int/. 
17.  Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); 
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19. “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement,” NATO, accessed May 17, 2010, 
http://www.nato.int/. 
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The deployment of BMD elements brings to Romania a substantial 
amount of U.S. investment that boosts the local economy around Deveselu Air 
Base.  In addition to the BMD elements, suppliers, vendors, basing and 
personnel add to the investment that Romania would receive in providing U.S. 
logistical support.  Failure to communicate legitimacy for the EPAA and BMD 
could define conditions for failure in NATO extended deterrence in Romania.20  
Profit motives that are not transparent would undermine the legitimacy for 
deployment of BMD elements in Romania.  Criticism outside of NATO for its 
decision to deploy BMD in Romania compounds only by a Romanian decision for 
BMD that serves as profitable for Romania’s relationship with the United States.   
However, NATO extended deterrence does not appear to encourage 
countries operating in their own interest, and frames failure when attempting to 
go at it alone as typified by the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.  Commander, 
United States European Command, Admiral Stavridis, said: 
The complexities of managing a military-to-military relationship with 
Russia are high. On one hand, there are many areas of potential 
cooperation and partnership, including Afghanistan, arms control, 
counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, and eventually 
missile defense. On the other hand, many of our allies and friends 
in the region  remain concerned about Russian actions, including 
the conflict with Georgia in the summer of 2008, exercises on their 
borders like the Zapad series in 2009, and Russia’s continuing 
suspension of implementation of  the Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE) Treaty.21   
NATO acted as fast as legitimately possible in the 2008 Russia-Georgia 
conflict.  Moreover, debate persists as to which of the Russian, Georgian or 
NATO actions in this conflict were legitimate.  In light of similar criticisms, 
 
 
                                            
20. Summarized in the NATO 2020 document: search keyword “failure” 
21. James G. Stavridis, “Testimony of Admiral James G. Stavridis, United States Navy 
Commander, United States European Command Before the 111th Congress,” in European 
Command Posture Statement, (Washington, D.C., 2010): 34. 
 9
NATO’s EPAA and BMD response to threats ought to be fast enough, so that 
threat response immediately addresses incoming attacking missiles, while 
verifying “go” or “no-go” formalities. 
 Tensions among NATO members over Afghanistan and Iraq, where in 
both cases, a challenge for NATO was maintaining cohesiveness where NATO 
appeared weak in the test of strength.  These tensions continue to discourage 
NATO cooperative decision-making again.22   
Even though U.S., Romanian or NATO self interests surface, NATO 
members on NATO’s frontier, such as Romania, are particularly interested in a 
strong trans-Atlantic partnership, securing in NATO’s interests and bolstering 
security over the Black Sea for the region.23  Romania proactively has been 
accepting burdens, and deepening Maritime Partnership Program Interoperability 
Relationships with the United States and NATO members in the Black Sea.24  
Indeed, former Romanian Chief of the General Staff (CHOD), Admiral Gheorghe 
Marin claims missile defense in Romania follows an extension of larger trends 
protecting NATO and American armed forces stationed in Europe.25  In addition, 
Admiral Marin confirms that strategic cooperative bilateral training and exercises 
continue appearing to some NATO members as a change in NATO policy in 
Eastern Europe.  This change incorporates the strengths of NATO members on 
the periphery of NATO’s overarching security. 
At the same time, the Romanian decision reflects NATO’s extended 
deterrence goals; Commander U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) claims that 
                                            
22. “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement,” NATO, accessed May 17, 2010, 
http://www.nato.int/. 
23. Nik Hyneka and Vitt Stritecky, “The Rise and Fall of the Third Site of Ballistic Missile 
Defense,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43, no. 2 (2010): 179–187; Deborah 
Sanders, “Maritime Security in the Black Sea: Can Regional Solutions Work?” European Security 
18, no. 2, 2009): 101–124. 
24. “USAFE Commander Wants Stronger NATO Bonds As New Financial, Geopolitical 
Challenges Loom,” Defense Daily International (2008); “Romanian National Security Strategy,” 
Government of Romania, accessed May 17, 2010, http://www.presidency.ro (in Romanian). 
25. Gheorghe Marin, “An Emerging Multirole Force,” NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace 
2 (Uithoorn, 2006): 115. 
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Romania appears willing to play an important expansionary role as a NATO 
member. USAFE leadership and the Romanian National Security Strategy 
agreed that hosting missile interceptors protects U.S. families in Europe and 
enhances NATO Article V commitments.  
The USAFE Commander and Octavian, a political scientist from the 
University of Bucharest, both agree that missile defense in Romania provides the 
Alliance’s Defenses with defense enhancements against a verifiable threat from 
Iran, and argue that Romania also meets, and exceeds its share of NATO’s 
Article V regional burden. In short, Romania’s support of NATO’s collective 
defense enhancements assure NATO of Romania’s willingness to influence and 
support NATO’s regional burden for missile defense and extended deterrence as 
agreed to by the Reunion of the Mixed Committee between Romania and the 
United States.26  
Most importantly, Romanian modernization of equipment to meet NATO 
extended deterrence security force goals according to Admiral Marin should 
weigh heavily against any criticism regarding NATO, the U.S. and Romania’s 
decision to deploy EPAA and BMD elements at Deveselu Air Base.27  Romania 
raises the standard for modernizing its military in the midst of domestic political 
complications and defense spending during financial crisis.   
For one, in 2008, Bucharest, Romania’s capital, hosted the NATO Summit 
which was regarded as a crucial event.28 Romania has published acquisitions 
from Lockheed Martin in 2008 and 2010, where Romania formed a partnership 
with Lockheed Martin in co-production of 17 TPS-79(R) Multi-Mission 
                                            
26. “The Reunion of the Mixed Committee for the implementation of the Agreement between 
Romania and the USA,” Romanian Ministry of Defense , June 18, 2010.  Accessed July 17, 2010, 
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27. Gheorghe Marin, “An Emerging Multirole Force,” NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace 
(Uithoorn, 2006): 6. 
28. “NATO: Bucharest Summit Will Be Crucial for NATO Future,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief 
Service, Oxford (2008): 1. ProQuest (192451715). 
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Surveillance Radar systems29 and executed purchase requests of $4.5 billion in 
F-16s.  In the midst of financial difficulties, Romania clearly prioritizes its budget 
to bolster its and NATO’s security with the modernization of its air forces and its 
support for EPAA and BMD obligations.30 
Finally, Romania’s influence of NATO extended deterrence appears to be 
taking shape in strong bilateral ties with the U.S. Armed Forces.  Former CHOD 
Admiral Marin and the former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) of the Romanian 
Navy, RADM Dorin Danila, both expressed to the CNE-C6F Maritime Partnership 
Program Team representatives that “it is good to see the strength of America is 
behind the Romanian people.”31  U.S. Navy presence solidified interoperability 
planning for the inaugural USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC 20) Black Sea 
Partnership Cruise (BSPC) in 2008.32  As reported by Nick Iliev, reporter for the 
Sofia Echo and Scott Miller, the C6F Public Affairs Officer, this first-time event 
included six Black Sea region country delegations, NATO and non-NATO 
members, adding to the list of significant milestones in NATO interoperability 
engagement.33 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis draws from widely cited historical accounts of NATO, as well 
as the latest vision documents, interviews, and journals describing key 
developing events, concerns and precedents from the U.S. EPAA and NATO 
missile defense, and the U.S. BMD site at Deveselu Air Base in Romania.  First, 
the evidence focuses on debates from both sides of the fence of analysts and 
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researchers on whether NATO-led deployment of missile defense in Eastern 
Europe, specifically Romania, is consistent or in tension with broader NATO 
extended deterrence objectives.  In addition, NATO documentation will guide 
assertions about the Alliance’s decision-making process, and this thesis also 
examines how these methods and sources are relevant to Romania’s decision.  
Last, as the deployment of missile defense in Romania is very much a matter of 
current events as this thesis is in process, data available will also be drawn from 
Joint Defender (JDEF) modeling, from Naval Postgraduate School lectures, the 
European Security Institute, and foreign sources translated from Romanian into 
English by the author of events as late as November 15, 2011.   
Next, JDEF modeling will provide best insight on missile over-flights to 
deeper target sets in Europe, or even beyond, when threats from intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBM) enter the picture in 2015, when the U.S. homeland then 
becomes a potential target, depending on the latest unclassified intelligence 
assessments.  JDEF modeling will explore some of these issues, classified 
database issues aside, to bolster this thesis argument.    
For modeling purposes, the JDEF model will assist in exploring coverage 
of Southeastern European target sets from AA SM-3 AEGIS assets by the year 
2015, and the potential effectiveness of afloat SM-3 AEGIS ships between 2011 
and 2015, and beyond. As Iranian missile ranges develop toward an ICBM 
capability, JDEF modeling will explore how this will affect SM-3 AA and afloat 
asset capabilities to intercept Iranian threats to the U.S. homeland.  The 
evidence will show what analysts synthesize the U.S., NATO and Russia and 
Romania can achieve in cooperation, successfully or not. 
In summary, this paper will not attempt to distill many years of conditions 
for NATO expansion relative to specific decisions over deployment of BMD, nor 
all of the evidence for the threat from Iran by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).  Moreover, it will 
only address the extended deterrence from the view of the Congressional 
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Research Service (CRS) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that 
concludes that Iran’s nuclear program is not for peaceful purposes, and that 
Iran’s most likely delivery of a nuclear warhead against the United States or 
Europe would be by the use of ballistic missiles.   
Russian objections and concern over NATO capability enhancements, and 
the U.S. bilateral approach to BMD deployment in Romania will be addressed in 
the scope of this paper as appropriate.  However, it is necessary to understand 
the larger conceptual purposes for NATO and U.S. extended deterrence.  On the 
one hand, NATO’s aims in specific areas, for example, how the political 
processes realize EPAA and BMD system element deployment at Deveselu, 
Romania, show how NATO follows consistent NATO decision-making. On the 
other hand, a complete understanding of this issue requires consideration of 
NATO and U.S. long-term goals on a wide scale; what they are attempting to do, 
and what their goals are, and how that will enhance NATO and U.S. security.34 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In order to understand NATO and U.S. extended deterrence by way of 
BMD deployment, diplomats and military officials must understand the extent of 
this deployment. Following this thesis introduction, Chapter II discusses 
conditions for success or failure of the BMD site at Deveselu Air Base.  Chapter 
III discusses the role of U.S., NATO, European, Russian and Romanian security 
perspectives, missile defense policies and capabilities.  Chapter IV considers 
cooperative U.S. EPAA, NATO and Romanian cooperative deployment of land 
based BMD element scenarios from Deveselu Air Base, Romania.  Chapter V 
asserts conclusions and recommendations based on cooperative U.S., NATO 
and Romanian decisions.  
Finally, this research will explore the value added by the EPAA and BMD 
coverage of Southeastern European ashore by 2015, and the potential 
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effectiveness of afloat deterrence deployed between 2011 and 2015, and 
beyond. Iranian missile range development toward an ICBM capability 
synergizes NATO’s decision to support U.S., Romanian EPAA and BMD 
extended deterrence.  This deterrence will affect SM-3 AA and afloat asset 
capabilities to intercept Iranian threats to the U.S. homeland.  Politics and 
financial support will fall in line when the evidence synthesized reveals how 
preparedness by the United States, NATO, and Romania posit cost effective 
continuation in defense. 
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II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE SUCCESS OR 
FAILURE OF BMD SITE AT DEVESELU AIR BASE, ROMANIA  
The twenty-first century features the importance of global political 
negotiation in the face of BMD proliferation by North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and 
India.   Fortunately, for the United States, trans-Atlantic Alliance relationships 
have never been stronger militarily.  U.S. armed forces and European partner 
militaries have seen unprecedented activity together through the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars over one of the longest periods of conflict for the United States.  
Interoperability in BMD deployment with U.S. Allies, on the one hand, while 
ballistic missile threats proliferate on the other hand, are the two opposed 
trajectories that merge into a real need for cooperation with BMD from Romania.  
BMD extended deterrence objectives fit the threat circumstances for emerging 
theory on how to address ballistic missile proliferation and its development over 
the last few wars.  Inherent to the features of the circumstances are the 
requirements for legitimacy, purpose and resolve.   To gain public approval, 
Europe and the United States must continually set a high negotiation standard 
and precedent.  U.S. actions to bolster Europe’s BMD defenses cooperatively by 
way of NATO echo what the United States appears to be successfully negotiating 
with its defensive military capabilities.  Despite varying measures of effectiveness 
before and after the Gulf War, numerous successful tests of BMD elements impel 
the United States to implement BMD and the EPAA in Europe from Romania to 
protect its allies and U.S. troops deployed abroad. 
The deployment of U.S. missile defense interceptors in Romania is 
consistent with declared North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assurance 
goals through interoperability; it is also how the United States assures allies and 
deters aggression in support of U.S. extended deterrence, while watching 
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carefully the peace between Europe-Russia and states within Europe.35  The 
diplomatic relations in this case follow a new pattern by which NATO, in 
conjunction with U.S. leadership, shapes interests and restraints in security 
reform on its eastern flank.36  At the same time, international relations (IR) 
perspectives matter, and are at the core of negotiations by political and military 
officers working on this EPAA and BMD project for NATO, Europe and United 
States that advances policies and capabilities based on real technology accepted 
by diplomatic intentions and desired conclusions behind EPAA and BMD.37  
The purpose of this analysis is to align current events in BMD with the 
current long-term strategic policy for the United States in Europe and to explore 
the broader U.S.-Europe relationship within which the issue of BMD exists.  
Romania, the United States and NATO must necessarily define objectives for the 
strategy and politics supporting the NATO BMD mission and prioritize these 
objectives.  Survival or defeat of U.S.-Europe policy strategy hinges on 
diplomatic, informational and economic resources and features of contemporary 
aims of modern defenses that would postpone the next modern war on NATO 
and Alliance terms.   
A. BMD CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The strategic policy advancing defensive BMD capabilities must follow a 
discernible baseline for dialogue that transcends diplomatic and military 
negotiations transparent to Romanian, U.S. and European diplomats, politicians 
and military officers, as well as their Russian colleagues.  The following 
discussion develops the objectives for this framework for the BMD project in this 
light.38  European popular opinion holds the key to approval of U.S. BMD and 
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EPAA protection over European soil.  Does European popular opinion hold the 
United States in high enough regard today because of who the United States is 
diplomatically? The United States-Romanian relationship has a long and 
consistent history.  The Romanian-NATO relationship has a similar history and 
both relationships continue to grow closer.  For European attitudes to associate a 
favorable response to the United States and its deployment of BMD system 
elements in Romania, the United States must weigh its behavior and choices 
carefully in carrying out its legally binding agreement over BMD with Romania.  
Yes, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show shifting European and global opinion, 
but these wars only demonstrated U.S.’s resolve that assures and deters 
aggression from Europe’s Black Sea gateway to the east.39  For all the 
diplomats, politicians and military officers concerned, the United States, Romania 
and NATO basic trajectory for the BMD project in Romania assures a modern 
defensive capability for Europe.  
Improving security-institution interrelations between the European Union 
and NATO also defines another objective for the United States. The European 
Union and NATO understand that the United States has the military capabilities 
to do what the United States wants to, strategically and otherwise, globally.  The 
European Union and NATO members factor this into their military relationship 
with the United States.  What is NATO Transformation is also driving these 
dynamic political and military goals of its members.40  Since 1989, NATO has 
almost doubled in size from sixteen members to a current roster of twenty-eight 
independent member countries.41  With the nuclear issue supposedly “long since 
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faded, both in U.S. policy and in that of the Alliance,” NATO, the United States 
and Europe are embarking in policies beyond the old geographical limits.42 
Today, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, as well as pro-U.S., pro-NATO 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the French Air Force General, General 
Stéphane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, champion the 
EPAA and BMD.43  EPAA and BMD defensive capabilities align themselves with 
European security institution goals to maintain the relative peace in Europe.  A 
thwarted missile attack on Europe allows European security institutions time to 
conference a response.  What then will the United States successfully negotiate 
with European security institutions regarding BMD system element deployment 
over objections by Russia, and for how long?44   
Developing the right objectives, the realist approach for BMD, is one of 
caution to warnings of instability in international relations between U.S.-Russia, 
Europe-Russia and NATO-Russia.  While mindful that a debate on emerging 
power structure and policy reactions can ensue, Europe and the United States 
are bound to defending their own power structure and interests.45  Based on the 
premise that Russian chances of committing to a BMD solution are increasingly 
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more probable, Europe-U.S. relations must respond carefully at this point to 
support BMD in the interest of prolonging another sixty years of collective 
deterrence in Europe.46  At the same time, little information about the targeting of 
Russia by rogue states exists as common knowledge, while confirmed BMD 
proliferation is rampant and affirms the desires for U.S. initiatives necessary to 
defend against these threats and prolong the peace of Europe.47  Additionally, 
this initiative extends security for economic prosperity and NATO expansion to 
new Eastern European democracies.   
In contrast, the liberal framework, as promulgated after World War I or 
World War II, argued for the international impetus for cooperation and provision 
of non-traditional security and economic controls to protect humans from the 
futility of war and its economic devastation.48  Supervising shattered economic 
welfare and trade brought about the setting up of larger organizations.  In 
addition, larger institutions regulated this trade.  This represented a shift of 
responsibility to cooperative institutions for managing security in crises amidst 
other global issues and expanding mercantilism.49  In U.S.-Europe relations, the 
United Nations (U.N.) approaches such responsibility in a real way, or NATO 
which approaches it as the only organization that, oddly enough, brings Turkey, 
Russia, Norway, Canada and the United States to the negotiations table, unlike 
the European Union (EU) and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) to date.  The liberal framework surfaces here as the EPAA and 
BMD project adjoins the United States, NATO and Romania into a cooperative 
organization to implement extended deterrence for Europe. 
One leader may or may not shape the social dimension of the nation on 
the issue of BMD.  Nevertheless, the way that others react to the United States 
and Europe in regards to BMD is the critical constructivist feature that cannot be 
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generated from the realist or liberal point of view.50  Attending to identity politics, 
the constructivist point of view focuses the United States on continuing its role as 
the American pacifier in Eastern and Southeastern Europe in a social way.  
Current dynamics in Europe show how the United States continues realigning 
itself, while maintaining partnerships with traditional Allies to support freedom, 
democracy and political change.   
The real, liberal, and constructivist frameworks inevitably surface in the 
negotiations of all the parties involved and must meld together for a best 
approach that sidesteps power plays and exactly confronts the intentions of the 
missile proliferation threat. Europe and the U.S. officials ought to purposefully 
choose their target U.S. and global audience when drafting their long-term 
strategy of the EPAA and BMD.51  The real approach addresses the real threat 
identified here thus far in a major way.   Priority should be made to address the 
real threat with what are real capabilities that fall in line with the priorities for 
Europe, NATO and the United States in forming partnerships and applying bold 
systemic strategy, including the confluence of an armed defense.52  The 
challenge is that all NATO members must care enough about the real threat to 
alienate and establish the threat is inimical to all.  As the threat proves itself to be 
a real enemy requiring strategic BMD, all parties will have to agree to impose that 
entity as a legitimate enemy worth defending against with NATO backing and no 
longer leave room in the framework for an approachable settlement range for 
negotiation with the threat or this entity.53 
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The liberal outlook with its guarantees, gains only a percentage of the 
response in this arena.  Already, U.S. relations in Europe are at an advanced 
state and in need of real IR theory to address the real, non-traditional, missile 
proliferation, security threat.  The time is here again to remain ahead of the 
missile proliferation threat to its conclusion.  Liberal IR theory responds to limiting 
missile proliferation in some ways, but dismisses threats or priority issues in 
Europe covered by the EPAA vision.  Alternatively, a constructivist approach 
appears relevant to incorporating the current dynamics in negotiations between 
friends and partners for the deployment of BMD elements in Eastern Europe.  
BMD element deployment in Romania is a realist solution to a real threat.  The 
idea that the United States ought to deploy BMD system elements receives 
criticism, due to a threat some will continue to deny, but that more understand as 
real.  The realist approach assures us that NATO, the U.S. and Romania’s 
approach to collective security is going to deter the use of ballistic missiles by 
rogue threats and buy the trans-Atlantic Alliance time in case of a missile attack.   
B. PRIORITIZING POLICY OBJECTIVES 
Is the most important objective that Europe values the United States 
favorably so that BMD and EPAA are no longer European issues of concern, but 
rather of assurance to this trans-Atlantic Alliance?  Europe today values 
interstate and intrastate stability and peace, as already pointed out.  The United 
States is powerful militarily, a sovereign nation that holds its security as a priority 
issue, and regards global institutions as exogenous.  The United States agrees to 
defend the security of members of NATO but prioritizes the security of the 
homeland.54 Deploying BMD elements in Romania is justified because the United 
States already has BMD defending the United States.  BMD in Europe then 
serves as an extension of deterrence for the United States.  In addition to BMD, 
the United States weighs in globally on all dimensions of security, non-security 
                                            
54. The United States is also broad in its application of diplomatic, informational, military and 
economic power, pluralist as a state and carrying a mixed bag of issues while connecting 
domestic institutions to global ones.   
 22
and identity.  U.S. BMD deployments complement the weight of the United States 
in each of these dimensions.  U.S. BMD complements intervention and influence 
of “failed state” suppression, protects from pre-emptive use of force by ballistic 
missile threats, and can expand to provide an umbrella for humanitarian 
intervention where the United States is present.  While the United States applies 
a broad range of ideas in its application of military power, the United States 
retains today a modern and dependent nature in its identity as a pacifying military 
force in the world that in Europe adds support for its BMD cause.55   
The United States can also try to prioritize its integrity by matching what it 
is doing with what it appears to be doing.  Will the United States be able to 
anticipate whether Europe hates, loves or accepts the United States in response 
to how the United States is reconciling diplomatic initiatives with Russia and 
Central and Eastern Europe?56  It is a task where the number and diversity of the 
state-issues add to the complexity of resolving them.   Turkey, for example, 
exposes NATO to a range of civil and sub-state conflicts, notably on its border 
with Russia, where interstate frictions are attended by cries for independence 
and irredentism.  One such upheaval takes the form of extremism from members 
of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and Turkey.  Al Qaeda also remains a violent 
non-governmental organization and non-state actor nearby.  In all of these, 
however, Europe and the United States set the tone for democracy in all of these 
areas that require a defense.   
Thus, the resolve by the United States to do what the United States wants 
to in terms of capabilities, militarily and otherwise are prioritized above others 
because it is committed to defend itself and its European allies: allies like 
Romania.57  On the one hand, the United States augments Europe’s military 
capabilities and matches financial support for EPAA and BMD with its economic 
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resources.  The United States competes with other states while pursuing its own 
interests and ensuring its security.58  For this reason, not only will the United 
States continue to provide security globally for the foreseeable future but also 
sustain the sovereignty of European nations and reassure Europe with EPAA 
and BMD elements. 
C. POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS 
BMD in Romania is an extended deterrence opportunity for all of Europe 
from Iran.  Here the United States adds to its security, while cementing relations 
with Eastern and Southeastern Europe and deploys a defensive capability that in 
the eyes of some critics upsets the balance of power.  The remarks made after 
the NATO Summit in Lisbon by Russian President Medvedev argue to this effect, 
particularly when he invoked the risk that ongoing negotiations would instigate a 
new arms race.   
Despite the rhetoric, the United States’ plans are moving in a way that 
harmonizes and bolsters security in Europe’s eastern and southeastern 
peripheries, within the scope of NATO and with the efficacy of U.S. planning.59  
The alternative to such cooperative defense efforts as EPAA and BMD would be 
a long-term strategic policy that ultimately removes the United States from 
Europe.  NATO is already announcing dramatic downsizing and de-funding 
billets, but not to the point of extinction.  Spain is experiencing the downsizing of 
NATO land component (LCC) in Madrid, while preparing to welcome the 
expansion of the U.S. Naval Base in Rota that will add 3200 U.S. Navy 
personnel, all of which must fall under the umbrella of BMD protection.  Today 
the focus of U.S. partnership is augmenting its past partnerships while in search 
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of new partnerships that reach out to Southeastern and Eastern Europe with 
BMD and the EPAA shifting U.S. objectives that gradually gain broad 
adherence.60  
Growing momentum for EPAA and BMD can be hampered by any loss in 
credibility in what the United States is currently doing, or how it means to go 
about doing it.  At the end of the Cold War, Europe cheerfully formulated who the 
United States was by what it did in Europe.  Similarly, opinion regarding 
momentum for EPAA and BMD agreements may remain on the upswing but only 
for so long, if the following European generations do not feel the same about 
EPAA’s strategic effectiveness.  Nothing was certain here regarding the wide 
acceptance of BMD, which is why the agreement confirming deployment of 
EPAA and BMD system elements in Romania is surprising and telling of fresh 
possibilities.  A fresh perspective on an open-ended framework for BMD and 
EPAA negotiations may allow the shaping of the long-term strategy, based on a 
prior state of relations between the United States and Europe that are strong and 
clear.61 
Differing sources of support are required for this strategy.  There is the 
need for systemic, state and individual level approbation.  Public support in 
Europe may need to focus on how U.S. interests change and how the United 
States wants to exercise power.62  Europe is aware of the consequences of the 
deployment of BMD system elements and the stigma that it creates.   That said, 
the policy followed by the building, operation and maintenance of EPAA and 
BMD system elements will be successful by how the United States advances its 
negotiations of the policy and how Europe receives it.   
In the meantime, all European states will have time to make of the threat 
from Iran what the strategy of the U.S., Allies and partners make of it, and act 
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with one accord.  Addressing deployment of BMD system elements summarizes 
well the power policy of the United States.  The realist approach here makes 
sense, supporting an emerging power structure and policy committed to 
extended deterrence.  Peppered with liberal and constructivist theory, realist-
centric power theory, focused on strategically defensive state security, is what 
the EPAA and BMDS elements will work to provide to all of Europe.   
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III. SECURITY PERSPECTIVES FROM U.S., ROMANIAN, 
RUSSIAN, AND EUROPEAN POINTS OF VIEW 
Since 2001, the United States introduced overarching U.S. BMD security 
perspectives to Europe and Russia on how it planned to counter ballistic missile 
proliferation.  The Bush plan and today’s adaptive missile defense plan have 
been introduced since then, similar in their end but different in their 
implementation.  The Bush plan would deploy BMDS elements in Poland and the 
Czech Republic.  The Bush plan also discomfits the Russians because 
shouldering the entire cost of their BMD system would become prohibitive for 
their budget.  Russia’s rhetoric after this plan announced dramatic challenges to 
the progress of BMDS deployment diplomatically.  Under the Obama plan EPAA 
and BMDS appear to have been de-politicized, but at what cost to us?  The 
current adaptive missile defense plan for BMDS element deployment to Romania 
draws a different response from Russia that appeases Russian leadership, for 
now, but not by much.  The United States, Europe, and NATO prefer that Russia 
control its own BMD system elements and, in turn, let NATO also control theirs.   
The momentum for EPAA and BMD from the United States, Europe, and 
NATO for BMD deployment in Romania despite Russia’s discouraging and 
tentative position has to be on a very sound foundation that continues to build.  If 
Romania is supporting BMD on the sound foundation of increased interoperability 
with NATO and the United States, then its relationship with the United States and 
BMDS deployment should be of little cause for concern to Europe or Russia.  
The approach of building a sound foundation diplomatically in conjunction with a 
transparent deployment of BMDS elements in Romania is a bold move on the 
part of the United States and a brave offer for Europe to accept.  Similarly, 
Romania is bold to accept to support BMDS elements as a NATO periphery 
member in favor a strong trans-Atlantic partnership securing freedom of the 
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Black Sea for all.63  A sound foundation of cooperation on U.S., Romanian, 
Russian and European security perspectives that offer Russia buy-in on Alliance 
terms, then, is the desired end that is in line with NATO goals.   
A. U.S. SECURITY PERSPECTIVES 
The U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy 
(NMS) state their position clearly regarding the overarching position of the United 
States to do all it can to strengthen in partnership the security relationships that 
benefit coalition capabilities.  EPAA deployment of BMDS elements in Romania 
is the adaptive ballistic missile defense system the United States and their 
coalition partners plan to effectively deploy by 2015.  The goal, from the U.S. 
perspective, is to deter regional adversaries from gaining ascendancy through 
their own imported ballistic defense elements, summarized as follows: “we will 
strengthen our regional deterrence postures—for example, through phased, 
adaptive missile defense architectures—in order to make certain that regional 
adversaries gain no advantages from their acquisition of new, offensive military 
capabilities.”64  
The U.S resolutely pursues missile defense in this recent National 
Security Strategy.  Whether through collective action with Russia in partnership 
based on common interests, or by accommodating Russia’s strong international 
voice, or none of the above, the EPAA and BMDS continues to be the resolution 
of the United States to counter missile proliferation.  The Obama adaptive missile 
defense plan is resolute to deter adversarial plans in the European periphery 
while transparent to Russia in its aims.  From Moscow, President Obama’s 
international order found in the NSS claims:   
As President of the United States, I will work tirelessly to protect 
America’s security and to advance our interests. But no one nation 
can meet the challenges of the 21st century on its own, nor dictate 
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its terms to the world.  That is why America seeks an international 
system that lets nations pursue their interests peacefully, especially 
when those interests diverge; a system where the universal rights 
of human beings are respected, and violations of those rights are 
opposed; a system where we hold ourselves to the same standards 
that we apply to other nations, with clear rights and responsibilities 
for all.65 
The views of both the Bush and Obama administrations continue to 
advance the United States security interests.  With the EPAA and BMDS, the 
United States will advance those security interests in coordination with Europe, 
while negotiations with Russia continue. For now, the NDS and NMS reach out in 
earnest to Russia for strategic arms reduction, counter-terrorism, and the like, but 
the most important issue for the NDS is cooperation with Russia on BMD.  The 
NDS and NMS voiced shared concern about and for Russia66 and U.S.’ interests 
and values that seem central to relational success. Cooperation with Russia 
appears critical because of Russia’s major role in dialogue, militarily and 
diplomatically, about security with its neighbors and Asia.67  The NDS and NMS 
desire that Russia owns security concerns and threats, while cooperating with 
the United States in Europe.  Unfortunately, Russia is making its voice known in 
a way that discourages progress of EPAA and BMDS deployments, at least 
politically, albeit answering its own influential ends.   
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes increase in missile 
defense and cooperation in a parallel effort to WMD reduction efforts worldwide.  
On this issue, treaties bind the United States and Russia.  And although the QDR 
currently leaves open possibilities for BMD negotiations with Russia, the QDR 
also reflects concerns that the United States has about Russia.  The QDR further 
affirms that the United States will continue to regard Russia’s neighbors, such as 
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Romania and Poland, as independent and sovereign states. 68  Here again, it is 
at these junctures that Russia encounters difficulty in explaining its desires for 
international influence in ways that the United States no longer can, nor should 
accept.  In sum, the United States will continue to engage and cooperate with 
Russia as issues emerge; however, it takes the same stance on other countries 
of U.S. concern.   
In summary, the U.S. NDS tasks the U.S. military with playing a 
responsible role and engage the design of defensive security through EPAA and 
BMDS elements from Romania.  The NMS calls for an active role from the Joint 
Force and the United States European Command in the defensive security 
design for NATO while cooperating with Russia. Integrating this with a tentative 
Russian defense policy is still where we are today.  However, Admiral Mullen’s 
approach to this defensive design includes the leadership of the United States as 
“facilitator, enabler, convener, and guarantor to address problems that are truly 
international in nature.”69  The threat is only part of the problem, but consensus 
on addressing the threat with BMDS reflects a large part of why the United 
States’ leadership provides the above guidance in the NDS and NMS.  The future 
of joint capabilities to assure favorable outcomes in international deterrence and 
allied assurance are one way the United States will lead and advance America’s 
interests strategically with BMD.  In brief missions or in sustained military 
capability, United States’ defensive designs are maximizing deterrence and 
minimizing aggressor capability from as far as geographical limits allow.  EPAA 
vision and BMD deployment is the collective defensive design that marks the 
future of trans-Atlantic Alliance deterrence and continues to be a high priority for 
NATO and U.S. military strategy.   
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B. ROMANIAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES 
Romanian security perspectives continue to increase engagement with the 
United States through NATO and bilaterally.  Now that there is a clear Joint 
Declaration between the United States and Romania, and the signatures are 
concluded over an agreement for the building, operation and maintenance of 
land based BMD system elements from Deveselu, for Romania it is important to 
revisit the debates prior to this juncture from Romanian points of view.  
Talks with Romanian Armed Forces Officers confirm that a tension of 
resentment, instead of pressures of conflict, with Russia exist that are different 
from the reasons for the 2008 Russian-Georgia Conflict.  Romania’s February 
2010 decision to support BMD is consistent with its initiatives to modernize and 
equip to the latest standards its missile defense capability with NATO 
Transformation security force goals, according to former Romanian CHOD 
Admiral Marin.  Additionally, Romanian Armed Forces Leadership makes the 
case for continued diplomatic solutions via multilateral partnerships and 
intensified political dialogue, positioning Romanians as builders of stability and 
security as far east as the Black Sea Region.   
Tensions regarding the Romanian case began with bold policy changes 
taking shape with the announcement, in February 2010, by Romanian President 
Traian Basescu expressing full-fledged support for hosting missile interceptors in 
a developing U.S. Anti-missile Defense Shield Proposal. Admiral Marin claims 
missile defense in Romania follows an extension of larger trends protecting 
NATO and American Armed Forces stationed in Europe.  The claims also agree 
with Romania’s current bid for new or used F-16s from Lockheed Martin that will 
equip them over the next few years and complements the Aegis Radar product 
for deploying in the BMD solution.70 
Admiral Marin summarizes that strategic cooperative bilateral training and 
exercises confirm what continues as a change in NATO policy in Eastern Europe 
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security interoperability and engagement. Romanian, U.S. and NATO strategic 
security cooperation clearly appears to be taking new form with the U.S. Defense 
Shield Proposal, originally proposed to the Czech Republic and Poland, that is 
now receiving wide acceptance. The new proposal covers all of Romania’s 
security concerns, exceeding comprehensive NATO and Romanian security 
objectives.   
This Romanian decision reflects NATO’s familiar concept of NATO 
Transformation that continues to conform NATO defense to European and U.S. 
defensive security needs. In the wake of being a Partnership for Peace member 
(PfP), Micu, a doctoral student in International Relations at the University of 
Cambridge, suggests that Romanian membership to NATO in 2004 is a strong 
indication of popular Romanian opinion and support for Romania’s Western 
European identity. Romanian European identity organically conforms as the 
average Romanian develops their evolving sense of community to other founding 
and peripheral NATO members. Romanian Strategy is playing an important 
expansionary role as a NATO member, accepting burdens, and actively 
deepening maritime partnership program interoperability relationships with the 
United States and NATO members in the Black Sea.    
Although there appears to be widespread consensus on supporting NATO 
initiatives, Romania’s decision begs debate as to why it is doing so, and for what 
reasons.  By going through with its decision, Romania reflects NATO initiatives in 
provisioning the Alliance’s Defenses with defense enhancements against a 
verifiable threat from Iran, in turn crediting Romania with meeting and exceeding 
a portion of its NATO Article V regional burden. Romania demonstrates its 
willingness to exhibit all the characteristics of Europeanism, accepting and 
maintaining probationary status as a European Union member since September 
2007.  It appears also that hosting missile interceptors supports protecting U.S. 
families in Europe and satisfies NATO Article V commitments. This and other 
similar reasons justify how Romania reflects NATO initiatives, ranging from 
Eastern European security concerns regarding Russia to strategic reassurance 
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by the Euro-Atlantic community, and as declared by the Joint Declaration 
between the United States and Romania.    
This Romanian decision influences NATO Transformation.  Romania’s 
support of NATO collective defense enhancements appears arguably consistent 
with its plans to support NATO regional burden for missile defense.  Romania’s 
influence of NATO Transformation appears to be taking shape in parallel with 
strong bilateral ties with the U.S. Armed Forces, a NATO founding member.  U.S. 
Navy presence in Romania solidified interoperability planning for the inaugural 
USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC 20) Black Sea Partnership Cruise (BSPC) in 
2008.   As reported by military and public media observers, this first time event 
embarked six Black Sea region country delegations, NATO and non-NATO 
members, adding a significant milestone in NATO interoperability engagement.   
Romania raises the standard for acting interdependently, a formidable NATO 
characteristic, with its political communication to NATO and defense spending 
with the United States amidst economic crisis conditions.   
The project of missile defense then provides for Romania’s territorial 
sovereignty and supports energy initiatives while influencing regionally viable 
NATO goals.  The evidence shows BMD supports NATO’s 2020 strategy for 
deterrence and reassurance in the face of threats and the challenge of 
destabilizing costs.   BMD presents the option of deterrence as a projection of 
power outward, while reassurance remains internal to NATO’s security and 
transformation needs.  Deterrence by naval power, air power, nuclear power and 
now ballistic missile power follows the trend of preparedness acceptable to 
NATO Transformation.     
Reassurance and deterrence are pivotal to NATO Transformation needs 
today. BMD in Romania assures NATO with greater influence in security policy, 
foreign policy and military strategy to preserve the peace.  This assurance also 




NATO have also transformed.  Only the threat by Iran is mentioned in the NATO 
2020 document, where BMD in Europe as a significant capability reassures 
NATO’s eastern flank. 
As a result of BMD’s deterrence and reassurance capability, consensus 
for deployment of BMD in Romania appears widespread, with the exception of 
some who believe NATO Transformation on NATO’s eastern flank should move 
faster.  Consensus for missile defense in Romania conforms to NATO 
Transformation and reflects expansionary goals.  Romania, meeting the 
challenge of BMD mission, reflects how NATO wants to influence how Romania 
and NATO members should be thinking about security in the long run.  
Romanian security perspectives benefit largely from NATO 
Transformation goals and vice versa.  Since 2002, all levels of the Romanian 
Ministry of Defense contributed to NATO force goals in interoperability and 
partnership for a more coherent and efficient integration.  Romania expects to 
influence peace and security in the Black Sea Region that in turn will lead to 
unprecedented economic investment and prosperity. Bilateral affairs in missile 
defense in Romania, too, represent an advanced step for Romania in supporting 
regional NATO force burdens, responding to the latest NATO Transformation 
needs that remain transparent to NATO. 
C. RUSSIAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES 
Russian opinion holds that on strategic deterrence, command, and control, 
BMDS architecture by the United States and NATO would be redundant and 
unnecessary.  However, BMDS from Romania is refocusing seventy years of 
defensive security planning that apparently was spread thin across several foci.  
The Czech Republic and Poland support BMD defensive security because both 
assert that Russia is comparable to Iran as an Article V NATO threat. However, 
Europeans disagree with each other on this matter.  Defensive security from 
Romania was foremost on European minds when the Warsaw Pact absorbed 
Bulgaria and Romania under Soviet rule to influence states like Romania that 
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had very little power to resist.  Desires for Georgia to become part of NATO and 
part of European defensive security appears almost impossible with the tensions 
present between Georgia and Russia, as is the case with Ukraine.  In the 
aftermath of Iraq, the lack of consensus among twenty-eight NATO members 
regarding the war in Afghanistan is a step backward for NATO today, challenging 
consensus of defensive security U.S. BMDS deployments in Europe.    
Supposedly, gone are the days when Russian opinion could instill fear in 
Europeans.  Or, is such fear still on their agenda?71  Respect, fear, and resetting 
NATO policy is evidently critical to Russian civil-military relations, as well as to 
foreign and defense policies.  Russian priorities have gained the sympathy of 
some European and NATO allies, thus dividing NATO opinion.  To some NATO 
allies, exacerbating the Russian relationship is not an option, facilitating a 
Russian win.   Some NATO arguments portray Russia as a toothless challenge 
but respect what Russia puts on the bargaining table.  Russia is an international 
actor; and whether their information accurately reflects their capabilities or not, it 
still keeps pressure on the situation.   Without a second thought, in fact, Russian 
opinion moves and shakes decisions in Europe.  Russia has shown that it can 
divide the Allies, negotiate its ends, and provoke European fear that Russia will 
raise gas and oil threats and effectually intimidate Western, Southern and 
Eastern Europe. 
So is progress impossible?  The United States can move in any direction 
to formulate a continued plan for cooperative EPAA and BMD deployment with 
the support of Europe.  Although some of NATO and Russia’s desires diverge 
significantly today, some prospects for planning together look bright. 
Russia cannot divide NATO’s plans on deploying BMDS elements 
indefinitely.  Apparently, establishing the EPAA as a one-sector BMD shield is 
viable, although a two-sector shield system remains the only forthcoming reality, 
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with the way current negotiations between Russia, the United States and NATO 
stand.  At this point, pending Russia’s complete buy-in and support of the two-
sector shield, Russia would be privy to a collaborative picture of the threat and 
contribute to the collective defense of Europe.  Sharing appropriate sensor 
requirements, radar transitions, and an operational area picture are not 
farfetched notions to the United States, with which the Russian civilian-military 
leaders likewise concur.  Sharing the picture is the easy part.72  
Ultimately, however, no conclusion can yet be drawn, as the Russian 
attitude militarily based on Russian Military Federation Doctrine and civilian 
opinion remains tentative.  A Russian alternative response would imply that 
Europe is a global power, so Russia pursues sanctions with Iran while pursuing 
engagement that disassociates itself from any hostility with Tehran. 
Nevertheless, Russia desires a combined solution integrating the European 
NATO system elements that would include sharing control with Russia.  Russia 
continues to warn the United States that more negotiations are needed before 
BMD can even further marginalize European power.  Russian leverage is subtle 
today, but may not remain so tomorrow with Russian aims at restructuring and 
modernization.  Russians are again on the balancing end, fearful that the U.S. 
BMD system deployment is aimed at them and could be made able to neutralize 
their nuclear deterrence. 
D. EUROPEAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES 
European attitudes, opinions that consist of both their governments’ and 
their peoples’, regarding their stance on the EPAA and BMD in Romania also 
need weighing in negotiations.  Informed Europeans, particularly at the elite level, 
overall maintain that the United States has an active leadership role to play in 
forging the road ahead for EPAA and BMD.  Europeans and Allies yield to the 
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United States the direction of high-level defense policy arrangements in nuclear 
treaties and in contracts involving the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or the UN.  Today, NATO members, 
including Turkey, Poland and Spain, are cooperating with United States 
leadership and the momentum from the United States to deploy BMDS in 
Romania and on their territories.  
Complications threaten when European governments perceive wide gaps 
in the amount of coordination apparent in joint exercises or in the transparency 
behind the bilateral deployment of BMD system elements in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  This circumstance exacerbates European worry that communication at 
some points is becoming more one-sided and thus, unfair, which in turn raises 
suspicions and lowers trust.73  “Working closely with Moscow on developing joint 
ballistic missile defence and early-warning systems would eliminate a source of 
great tension between the two countries over the past two years.”74 The issues of 
transparency and trust make this a difficult-to-resolve challenge, with Russian 
opinion stressing that BMD cooperation needs to be a collaborative effort.  Time 
will tell whether these issues will be brief or long lasting.  At some point, 
Russians want to experience an exchange with the United States in which there 
is ongoing transparency and cooperation without loss of security to them.  How 
that can be achieved on both sides without European loss of confidence may well 
take some time.      
Apparently, there is a growing momentum of Europeans in NATO that 
desire to see a BMD plan succeed, as legal agreements are now in progress.  
European opinion, after the signing of the agreement between Romania and the 
United States, suddenly needs less time and money before they will implement 
their own compatible BMD capabilities as claimed by the Dutch and Finnish.75  
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However, Poland and the Czech Republic prioritize their view of the Russian 
threat before Iran and Russia sees defense against Iran as pointless.   
However, BMD between the United States, Europe, and Russia thus will 
not disappear, or at least not easily.  The investment for the United States and 
NATO for these negotiations is extensive.  The pieces are in place, the ball has 
started rolling, and now the strategy is to work out a feasible plan to benefit the 
entire region.  At best, the United States, Europe, and even Russia, would then 
appear to be on a convergent path described by Admiral Stavridis as follows: 
Working with Russia is about balance and seeking to find the 
potential for cooperation, while maintaining an honest and open 
dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including where we 
disagree. While a great deal of engagement with Russia is handled 
either by State Department in the diplomatic realm or directly by the 
Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, we at European 
Command are ready to pursue military-to-military communication, 
engagement, and even training and operations with Russia where 
and when appropriate.76 
Europe, Russia and the United States have decided to go cooperatively 
forward with BMD and their consequent deployment as of the Lisbon Summit 
November 2010.  As the Russians are aware, BMDS elements have already 
been planned and are already on BMD-capable ships and allotted land.  Quality 
Russian participation in BMDS deployment discussions has been reported from 
the Lisbon Summit.  Newspapers, websites, and other media have captured 
NATO’s claim to the following: 
In accordance with the detailed provisions of this Declaration, we 
have  also . . . decided to develop a missile defence capability to 
protect all NATO European populations, territory and forces, and 
invited Russia to cooperate with us…. We are actively pursuing 
cooperation with Russia on missile defence, including through the 
resumption of theatre missile defence exercises.77 
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In some circles, before the revolutions in the Middle East, deployment of 
BMDS elements in Romania and Bulgaria seemed laughable.  The Supreme 
Allied Commander Transformation, General Stéphane Abrial, however, stoically 
emphasized that BMD was the number one issue for NATO.78  With the 
unsettling events in the Middle East and the constant threats against Israel, 
cooperation between U.S. leadership and NATO leadership seems settled.   
How will European leadership continue to respond?  Will European 
leadership accept a two-sector shield in which Russia will be responsible for its 
BMD capability over its own territory, while NATO shares in and will be 
responsible for BMD capability for the remaining European populations, 
territories, and forces?79  As regards the NATO-Russian cooperation 2010 
Strategic Concept, will NATO and Russia come to a consensus on what the BMD 
project will need for its realization now that the United States has signed a legal 
agreement with Romania?80  NATO BMD and the U.S. EPAA appear to agree 
yet again.81 
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IV. COOPERATIVE U.S. EPAA, NATO, AND ROMANIAN BMD 
SCENARIO FROM DEVESELU AIR BASE, ROMANIA 
Romania, Poland, Turkey, and Spain recently expressed, by signed 
agreements, their embrace of EPAA and NATO BMD by way of supporting U.S. 
afloat or ashore system elements.82 The types of radars available to the U.S. 
military and the comprehensive capabilities and elements in Europe together 
form the infrastructure for command and control (C2), target detection and 
tracking sensors, and interceptor missiles that exist and are being successfully 
tested and integrated.  On track is the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) 
confirmation of the successful integration testing in an operational environment 
between BMDS PAA Phase 1 capabilities and the NATO ALTBMD system.  
NATO, the United States and Romania plan to deploy AA detection and 24 
interceptor missiles from Deveselu, Romania.   
The following Joint Defender Unclassified Modeling program (JDEF) 
explores the envelope of SM-3 Intercept capabilities from the geographic area 
surrounding Deveselu, Romania, and within the operating campaign conditions.  
JDEF modeling at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) engages students, 
faculty and staff to brainstorm operational scenarios with political ramifications.83 
Although the MDA has announced its own plans and evidences of how BMD and 
the EPAA will be effective, JDEF allows the analyst a means to understand the 
technical nature of the BMD and EPAA problem.  This JDEF chapter is useful as 
a reference for the technical terms associated with BMD and the EPAA, as well 
as the relationships between of all of the BMD elements that NATO policies 
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intend to implement.  The JDEF download included unclassified database 
information from capital city coordinates to defender platform capabilities to 
attacker threat missile ranges.  This JDEF model generated in September 2011 
provides a basic overview for how the Romanian Air Force Base in Deveselu 
would be effectual as the U.S. BMD site, now that the bilateral agreements 
between the United States and Romania are signed.  The author then added the 
location of Deveselu with the technical information about the capabilities 
announced by the agreements that the site would employ.  The author then 
compiled the simulation again with the addition of this Deveselu data point and 
interpreted the results as discussed below using information from the program’s 
manual.      
The model below describes the role the Deveselu interceptors will have in 
disrupting alleged Iranian attacking launch site threat models at an unclassified 
level. This U.S. Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense site and the solutions from 
Deveselu demonstrate the burden sharing that Romania has accepted in 
cooperating with NATO and the United States in disrupting Iranian SRBM and 
MRBM threats as follows.  Piece by piece the model describes the attacker 
launch sites, afloat and ashore defender positions, and the defense response. 
A. EPAA AND NATO BMD SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
The geographic area presented in the following model is limited to the 
European area of responsibility.  Current threat capabilities from Iran are within 
the scope of this model, where threats reach as far into Europe as 1,000 
kilometers and 1,500 kilometers. Figure 1 presents an overview of the defended 
positions, EPAA and NATO BMD solutions, BMD ashore and afloat platform 




Figure 1.   European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and NATO Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD) JDEF Model Overview 
 
 
Figure 2.   Defended European Asset Positions 
Figure 2 highlights the high-density populated capital city areas of London, 
Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, Warsaw, Bucharest, and Sofia.  For simulation 
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purposes, these cities represent an unclassified premise for where Iranian 
terrorism could preemptively strike to achieve its ends, and may but does not 
necessarily constitute the real-world threat. 
B. IRANIAN MRBM THREAT ATTACKER POSITIONS 
Threat positions at the assigned locations in this model are input as 
depicted in Figure 3 and are used in this simulation solely to generate output 
from the program.  They are not the exact positions based on real intelligence 
assessments about Iranian launch positions.  The program allows the attacker 
positions a maximum number of missiles the attacker can launch from fixed or 
mobile launch sites at its defended asset during a planning scenario.  For 
simplicity, each attacker launch site is allowed one missile for all defended assets 
sets. Larger numbers of attacker missiles, of course, will give the attacker 
maximum flexibility, but complicate JDEF model calculations and the time 
required to generate a solution.  All of the launch sites shown here are within the 
territory of Iran.  Adding Syrian or Belarusian threat inputs are outside the scope 
of this scenario, but are part of EPAA and NATO BMD efforts that include 
forecasting elements that will deploy in Poland to combat these threats. 
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Figure 3.   Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) Attacker Launch Sites 
The integration of EPAA and NATO BMD today is complete.  Testing 
continues that refines the current architecture and plans against future threats.  
The platforms used here represent afloat platforms from the Black Sea and 
Persian Gulf, as well as ashore elements in Deveselu and in the vicinity that can 
detect and track ScudB, ScudC or Iranian MRBMs.  The ten attacker launch sites 
in this scenario launch Iranian MRBM attacker missiles that are targeting the 
defended cities in Figure 1 and Figure 2.  The attacking missiles appear to have 
made some distance from launch on their way to the defended positions, but this 
is a modeling constraint.  The red dotted lines merely show the path of the 
attacking missiles and its countervailing interceptor missile with the interceptor’s 
assignment path.  Successfully tested interceptors intend to detect and arrive at 
attacking launch sites during the attacking missile’s thirty-second boost phase.  
Early detection is critical to the success of an interceptor kill, which critics thought  
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impossible.  Shown in Figure 4, in both ashore and afloat solutions, are intercept 
attacker missiles from defense sites in Deveselu, the Black Sea and the Persian 
Gulf.  
 
Figure 4.   Aegis Ashore / Afloat Ballistic Missile Defense Solutions 
C. AFLOAT AND ASHORE RADAR ASSIGNMENTS 
EPAA and NATO BMD deployment are only possible with the cooperation 
of all NATO allies.  As seen at best in Figure 4, radar coverage, radar 
assignment and immediate over-flight trajectory of the interceptor missile that 
needs to arrive at the attacker launch missile in a timely manner are over Turkey, 
parts of Greece, and Southeastern Europe.  The attacker missiles, if allowed to 
launch unimpeded would have over-flights over Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Moldova, Ukraine, and Poland, where Ukraine and Moldova are NATO countries.  
All NATO countries in the know would facilitate the necessary immediate 
execution and response time to destroy the attacking missiles. 
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Launch sites in Figure 5, for modeling purposes, target Amsterdam, 
Warsaw, London, Bucharest and Berlin.  Each of those launch sites would be 
under the sharp eye of the SPY radar aboard the DDX platform deployed in the 
Persian Gulf, capable of making radar assignments for attacking MRBMs from as 
many as five launch site origins.  Multiple systems verify the radar assignments 
from the DDX platform, including those aboard other afloat platforms or AA in the 
area. Here “DDX” is a JDEF modeling term that reflects DDG variants. 
 
Figure 5.   DDX Radar Assignments 
The AA assignments complement Romania’s anticipated purchase of 
latest generation F-16 jets.  Eyewitness accounts discriminating attacking 
missiles traveling at thousands of miles per hour, from a commercial airliner 
traveling at hundreds of miles per hour, is exactly what the NATO and the 
concerned international community would want to reassure their publics about.  
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In Figure 6, the intercept assignments prepare against attacking MRBMs 
targeting Amsterdam and London using Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) by Hit-To-Kill (HTK) exo-atmospheric missile defense.  Simultaneously, 
a Patriot Battery assigns Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles to engage 
MRBMs launched from attacker launch sites three and four, directed at 
Bucharest and Sofia.  In moments, the systems from Deveselu are working 
cooperatively with afloat and other ashore platforms, as well as interactively with 
NATO command, to ensure against leakers that remain unassigned and prevent 
them from successfully penetrating BMD defenses.  Here the initial defenses also 
create an alarm shared by NATO countries, allowing them the benefit of 
triggering national early warning systems and preparing to follow their own order 
of battle in defense. 
 
Figure 6.   Ashore Defender Position Intercept Assignments from Deveselu, 
Romania 
Afloat BMD capability already regularly makes port calls in the Black Sea 
to the cities of Constanta, Romania and Varna, Bulgaria.  The USS Monterey 
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deployed for the Mediterranean, arriving in the Black Sea in the port of Constanta 
on June 14, 2011.  Figure 7 shows DDX and CG BMD capable ships assigning 
SM-3 intercepts from the Black Sea to defend Warsaw, Paris and Berlin against 
MRBM attacks from launch sites two, five and six.  The positions of the afloat 
platforms are random, and the platforms would successfully arrive at similar 
intercepts from anywhere in the Black Sea.   
 
Figure 7.   Afloat DDX / CG Defender Position SM-3 Intercepts from the Black 
Sea 
In summary, the above scenarios show the successful confluence of 
EPAA and BMD capability made possible only by the conferencing of national 
European priorities with a common outlook on BMD.  NATO stands in the gap 
that bridges trans-Atlantic security during a time when such threats already exist.  
Simultaneity of BMD allows NATO and national militaries to be reassured merely 
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by being radar-present, and approaches missile threat deterrence in a new way.  
Romania, Poland, Turkey and Spain recently committed to being a part of that 
new way of implementing security.  The solution summary concludes with a 100-
percent intercept of seven launched missiles, with only seven percent expected 
damage due to unknowns.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
EPAA and BMD in Romania joins the practice of diplomatic international 
relations theory, security perspectives from military doctrine and models of a real 
threat to the United States, NATO, allies and partners, together.  Evidence from 
NATO’s recent policy statements and press releases confirm refinement in 
addressing characteristics, concerns and precedents in negotiating EPAA and 
BMD from the United States, all the way to Europe and abroad.  Analysts and 
researchers exist on both sides of the spectrum who agree or disagree as to 
whether U.S. deployment of BMDS in Romania or anywhere is consistent, or in 
tension with broader NATO-led strategic and political objectives.  As discussed 
earlier, President Obama advocates BMDS, and Republican Presidential 
candidates, Herman Cain, Rick Perry, and Mitt Romney promise it is part of the 
future of U.S. defense postures.   
The momentum for U.S. BMD deployment in Romania and in Europe is 
today at a record high.  Transparent signing of agreements, publicized visits by 
recently appointed U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to NATO countries 
supporting BMDS, in addition to research at the Naval Postgraduate School, the 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, and foreign sources translated 
from Romanian into English, confirm the publicity of this momentum.  NATO 
diplomats and military officials are ensuring that documentation guides 
transformation and the transparent conferencing of defense and capabilities 
decisions.   
Teamwork on EPAA and BMDS, with today’s number of participating 
democracies covering NATO deliberations over deployment of BMD, is making 
history.  Collective national defense, including the capabilities of a conference 
system of defense with advanced missile technology, is at the forefront of 
modern strategic defense against threats of modern war.  If the threat occurs, the 
defensive system will need the alert U.S. and NATO staffs, and a steady 
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Supreme Allied Commanding coach. Modern strategic defense regarding EPAA 
and U.S. BMD system elements, after all, will do what it is programmed to do, 
and whatever else that is directed by U.S. and NATO experts.   
EPAA and BMDS architecture planning and infrastructure deployment 
continue on schedule, despite Russian objections and concerns about NATO 
capability enhancements.  President Obama’s planned U.S. BMD changes to 
begin in Romania appeased Russian demands temporarily, but are resurfacing 
as NATO reaffirms long-term goals in southern, eastern, and western Europe.  
Russia does not accept the Iranian threat by itself and will need justification for 
the scope of the strategy supporting the NATO BMD mission going forward.  
Russia will not submit to U.S., NATO’s or European aims, unless those aims 
factor a level of respect their political, military leaders and intelligentsia believe.  
One such U.S., NATO and European aim does not exist, and the strategic 
purposes of the United States, NATO and Europe continue to grow in the midst 
of missile proliferation.   So these U.S., NATO and European aims diverge from 
Russian aims and instead advance a conference of EPAA and BMD missile 
defense effort with a number and pass-code that Russia, for now, does not get. 
The collective response against missile proliferation by the United States, 
NATO and new NATO members such as Romania, is consistent with declared 
NATO goals and the way forward towards a conferenced defense architecture.  
The high level of consensus in Romania for U.S. deployment of missile defense 
interceptors in the country bolsters political support for countering an already 
maturing missile proliferation threat.  Political and military collectiveness to vet 
cohesive defensive action against indiscriminately launched threats is a modern 
approach to how NATO is rightly shaping security reform on its eastern flank. 
The allies that build trust together will stay together.  U.S., NATO and Romanian 
security goals that work together will stay together.  Reciprocally, U.S. and NATO 
reassurance bolsters Romanian national strategic goals. 
Twenty-four U.S. SM-3 missile defense interceptors in Romania are the 
effective start to serving U.S., NATO and Romanian security needs agreed to in 
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September 2011.  Current reports address this discussion from singularly 
focused views, while this paper addressed Romania’s decision to support the 
U.S. BMDS elements from multiple political, military and strategic areas of 
concern.  Plans for the EPAA and AA U.S. BMDS elements in Romania reflect 
and support the U.S. national and Alliance strategic purposes. The political 
significance of agreement to deploy BMDS elements in Romania marks the 
beginning of a political momentum conferencing the agreements on EPAA and 
NATO BMD defense of the nations of Poland, Turkey and Spain, as well as 
Romania.  
The United States, NATO, Romania, and other NATO allies prepare their 
nations defensively against ballistic missile threats and missile proliferation.   
BMD capabilities reassure legitimacy in modern war on U.S. and NATO terms for 
the Alliance, while advertising deterrence, defense and assurance of European 
and U.S. populations and military service members serving in Europe.  The 
national strategy is building threat deterrence with the deployment of these U.S. 
BMD system elements in Romania, from where SRBM, MRBM, IRBM missile 
capability can be identified and ideally neutralized at launch.   U.S., NATO and 
Romanian national strategies confer on bolstering the advocacy for this 
deployment in U.S.-Romanian relations, in U.S. relations with other NATO allies 
and in the Alliance as a whole.  U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian BMD and 
EPAA milestones are hopeful and possible but unlikely in the immediate future. 
The conferencing and networking effect that the EPAA and U.S. BMDS 
connecting NATO members and partners achieves, some view as fostering risky 
political and military promoting competition between new members towards 
characteristically persuasive democratic behavior and clearly in support of 
desired NATO political-military objectives.  Romanians agreed to host U.S. BMD 
system elements and Bulgaria agreed to host such U.S. capabilities, too.  Now 
Romania, Poland, Turkey and Spain have agreements to allow the United States 
to build, maintain and operate infrastructure in support of EPAA and BMDS 
system architecture.  U.S. and NATO initiatives to negotiate this vision rightly 
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impute qualitative democratic changes to new NATO members while melding 
with tenured ones.  Embarking on advanced capabilities for all NATO members 
in this economically austere period hedges their national risks and challenges 
and reinforces the stability that a viable defense offers for long-standing 
democracies.   
In summary, in order to deter strategic and political governmental, non-
governmental and non-state threats, U.S., NATO and transatlantic Alliance 
diplomats and military officials must understand how best to employ the strategic 
and political advances in military capabilities of NATO members, and the extent 
to which these military capabilities cost effectively.  Why U.S. BMD deployment in 
Romania matters and why the decision promises the future in the advance 
conferencing of transparent and multi-present NATO capabilities moves NATO 
members to be prepared to think beyond this problem and future ones in a 
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